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The seriousness and stubbornness of the ecological crisis and the realization that 
technological and political solutions provide, at best, limited solutions has led many 
to rethink environmental education with an eye towards changing deeply ingrained 
attitudes and behaviors. A transformed environmental education holds great 
promise for reshaping our relationship with the world around us rather than leaving 
this up to chance. The goal of environmental education can be realized, however, 
only by means of significant revision of our notions of nature and of human 
perception and learning. Citing widespread “illiteracy and ignorance about the 
natural world,” Marion Gillian calls for the development of a “place–view;” 
education should foster a sense that “nature is [not] just another subject . . . [but the] 
immanent context of our lives” (Gillian 1996, v and vi). But place–based education is 
not just about focusing students’ attention on their immediate natural surroundings; 
advocates are quick to point out that it is also about moving beyond a single–
minded focus on the so–called hard sciences to create a more holistic curriculum that 
would include field ecology, literature, poetry, art, and writing. These sentiments are 
echoed by Arthur Zajonc’s call for an “epistemology of love” to replace the 
traditional “epistemology of separation.” When love is understood not only as a 
romantic affair, but as an internal attitude toward the world, it changes our 
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perspective on the learning process. Believing that only by loving what one studies 
can a person learn, Zajonc argues that environmental education should encourage a 
contemplative inquiry, intimacy, and participation (Zajonc 2006, 2) that can be 
realized by cultivating “a covert curriculum that educates for discovery, creativity, 
and social conscience” (Zajonc 2006, 8). After considering the arguments made in 
favor of a place–based and multi–, or trans–, disciplinary1 approach to 
environmental education—and largely agreeing with them—we will suggest that a 
more explicitly pluralistic approach is necessary and we illustrate by modifying 
Zajonc’s notion of how to use his two contrasting epistemologies.  
Place–based education, with its dual emphases of local place and multi– or 
trans–disciplinarity, is a challenge to traditional education and ways of knowing. 
Advocates of reform share a rejection of three components of traditional approaches 
to learning, and to environmental education more specifically:  1) The emphasis on 
science over the humanities and arts, 2) the distance created between knower and 
thing–to–be–known, and 3) the abstraction from particulars (e.g., place or culture) to 
the creation of general claims that are supposed to be true everywhere and always.   
The arguments offered by place–based education proponents are not 
particularly complex, but they are, we think, important and largely correct. For 
instance, Jennifer Sahn, in her discussion of childhood education, argues that 
children must develop a sense of empathy for the names and details of nature to be 
absorbed; we should teach “hard facts” only after they develop an emotional 
connection with the natural around them (Sahn 1996, viii and ix). David Sobel cites 
the nature writer and poet, John Burroughs, to make the same point: “knowledge 
without love will not stick. But if love comes first, knowledge is sure to follow” 
(Sobel 1996, 10). Sobel continues by describing ways teachers, for example, can 
encourage a sense of connection prior to looking with students at books about bird 
identification. He suggests ways of moving from typical in–class, text–book exercises 
to outdoor experiential learning. Children can, for example, follow streams by 
launching handmade boats, they can clean debris from the banks, and they can test 
the thickness of ice in winter. Older students can engage in local policy debates, 
create recycling programs, and the like (Sobel, cf., 21, 23, 24, and 27). Sobel speaks of 
                                                          
1 “Interdisciplinary,” “multi–disciplinary,” and “cross–disciplinary” are various ways of referring to 
academic work that draws from a variety of perspectives while remaining largely consistent with the 
particular disciplines drawn from. Trans–disciplinary approaches are to go beyond the expectational 
limits of particular disciplines to create new genres, or at least work that is not necessarily identifiable 
as fitting within. The difference is probably more one of degree than kind. In any case, both approaches 
are thought to be superior to work done entirely within one discipline.        
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having school children make and decorate wings from cardboard and dance as the 
birds they see on the schoolyard, of which he says, “and so we must begin in 
empathy, by becoming the animals before we can save them” (cf., 19).   
In favor of this shift in approach, Sobel cites three scientific surveys and his 
own experience as an educator. For example, Louise Chawla’s research regarding 
environmentalists’ motivations for caring so much about nature indicates that they 
spent many childhood hours outdoors in more or less natural places with adults 
who cultivated a respect and admiration for things natural (cf., 10). Sobel believes 
this evidence points to the need for place–based education instead of a problems 
approach. Focusing on problems—especially distant ones (e.g., rainforest 
destruction)—instead of cultivating connections with the subject, leads to fear, a 
further distancing as a result of that fear, and eventually to disengagement as adults. 
The “problems approach” fails in part because young students are incapable of 
much abstraction, leading them to overly simplified conclusions such as that wild 
animals are good and bulldozer drivers are bad (cf., 28). This oversimplification does 
not prepare us to deal with the social and natural complexity that is at play in most 
cases of environmental destruction.    
At this stage let us remark that Sobel’s concern is primarily with elementary–
aged school children. His aim is to convince teachers to think carefully about how 
they approach environmental education so as to not create fear—as he puts it, “No 
tragedies before the fourth grade” (cf., 27). He wants to encourage local place–
oriented empathetic connections in order that children are not so emotionally 
overwhelmed that they lose interest in things ecological as they mature. However, 
his concerns and solutions are applicable to us adult learners and teachers of adult 
students as well. Worries of emotional disconnection, oversimplification, and 
general ecological ignorance are, after all, just as real for us adults as they are for 
younger learners. Witness, for example, how complex environmental issues are so 
often simplified by the media and politicians as “jobs vs. trees.” Therefore, we need 
an account of a place–based approach that will embrace adult learning as well.  
Place–based and trans–disciplinary environmental education has been 
problematized in the university setting by John Elder.2  Similarly to those focused 
                                                          
2 It is notable that Elder gradually shifted his attention from teaching British Modernism in an English 
Department to the development of what is now the oldest environmental studies curriculum in the 
United States, begun in 1965. His move to a more interdisciplinary approach to learning grew out of 
both his interest in writers such as Thoreau, Wordsworth, and Frost and his location: Middlebury 
College in Vermont’s heavily forested Green Mountains. The coming together of British and American 
nature writing and the flora, fauna, and geography of such a setting made place–based and trans–
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more on childhood education, Elder believes that we need to find ways to move 
away from the traditional science–heavy environmental education towards more 
environmentally attuned approaches:  “without any stake in the places where we 
live, we walk through days in which there are trees but no tree in particular [and] we 
drive along roads that could be anywhere. . . . Such casual familiarity is the opposite 
of intimacy and attentiveness” (Elder 1998, 8). Place–based education is, though, 
only part of the answer. Science instruction might be improved by moving the 
classroom out of doors for certain lessons, but science seeks explanations that are 
generalizable—not specific or particular. Love and intimacy, on the other hand, with 
the natural (and for that matter, with each other) is necessary and cannot be 
developed through traditional science—placed–based or not—alone. Multi– or 
trans–disciplinarity is required as well.  
The argument for place–based and trans–disciplinary education is made of 
two parts:  the belief in the necessity of an emotional or sentimental attachment to an 
object of study (here, one’s environment) and a rejection of the idea that science is 
the only, or best, route to knowledge and understanding. The first of these two 
argumentative parts is based on an oft–cited line from Aldo Leopold, who says, “it is 
inconceivable to me that an ethical relation to the land can exist without love, 
respect, and admiration for land, and a high regard for its value” (Elder, cf., 12). This 
is supported in philosophical discourse through the work of David Hume, who 
argued that it is not reason that lies at the heart of ethics, but our sentimental 
responses to each other, events, and the like. Reason alone, Hume points out, cannot 
motivate. It can help us clarify and sort out difficulties, but without both self– and 
other–oriented sentiments, we would have nothing resembling morality (Hume, 
1998 [1751], 75–76). Thus any hope of long–term change with regard to how we 
interact with the environment must result in part from the fostering of empathy. 
Ethicist J. Baird Callicott argues that if Hume and Leopold are correct (and he thinks 
they are), the lessons of ecology and evolution should make us give up the 
“conquering Lord” image of humanity in exchange for one that sees us as intimately 
related to the rest of life; we are not the reason d’être of everything existing around 
us. Callicott argues that our other–oriented sentiments expand as we develop a sense 
of community with the rest of nature (Callicott 1999, 66-69).   
                                                                                                                                                                     
disciplinary education a particularly attractive possibility. In an early course entitled “Visions of 
Nature,” his students read English Romantic and American transcendentalist writers and studied the 
paintings and photography of Church, O’Keeffe, and Ansel Adams. Later he became one of the 
nonscientists recruited to teach alongside biologists, geologists, and geographers in the environmental 
studies major (Elder 1998, 2-6).           
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The second point of the argument for place–based and trans–disciplinary 
education—i.e., the doubt that science is the only, or best, route to knowledge—is 
related to the first most directly in that non–scientific routes to understanding are 
thought to better create a sense of connection and empathy than can science alone. 
Underlying this is the observation that science seeks explicitly to understand the 
world in terms of universalizable “laws.” As Elder puts it, the classical model’s quest 
for knowledge is in contrast to a romantic or creative approach (cf., 12). Science, 
though, is not to be replaced, but supplemented. Elder sees trans–disciplinary place–
based education as a way of endowing science with more meaning. His position is 
nicely illustrated in his recollection of his grandmother’s wisdom: “When in ibis 
tucks its head underwing to sleep, it resembles a heart. The ibis knows empathy . . . 
Remember that, alongside the fact that it eats worms.” (cf., 13).   
The above–mentioned contrast between the epistemologies of separation and 
of love provides some clarity for both elements of Elder’s argument. Zajonc begins 
with the same realization that emotion—namely love—of one’s object of inquiry is 
essential for depth of understanding to develop. Further, since “young people, who 
are beginners in everything, cannot yet know love, they have to learn it” (Zajonc 
2006, 1). University environmental education must, then, through a variety of 
approaches slowly cultivate connection to place through literature, poetry, art, 
writing, and the like. In contrast to this epistemology of love, Zajonc sees traditional 
science as representing, or employing, an epistemology of separation. Because we 
are looking for a certain kind of knowledge—i.e., we want to know what the world 
is like independent of our human perspectives, values, and biases—we objectify the 
things we want to know about. We want to know what an ibis eats, not what this ibis 
eats. We want to understand how cancerous tumors grow and react to various 
external stimuli—not just these cancer cells—because only then can our knowledge 
translate into power to predict and manipulate. We have generally approached 
education, especially at the university level, in this way. The problem, however, is 
that when this approach is not tempered with other ways of knowing and being in 
the world, it leads to thinking about the world in ways merely instrumental and 
manipulative (Zajonc, cf., 2).     
Thus, similarly to Elder and Sobel, Zajonc does not see the needed 
epistemology of love as a replacement for science. Although knowledge remains 
partial when we employ the objectifying epistemology of separation, “an 
epistemology of intimacy and participation, that is, an epistemology of love, . . . 
extends scientific and scholarly inquiry in ways that need not be . . . problematic . . . 
to our research disciplines” (cf., 2). That is to say that there are times appropriate for 
one or the other of these two general approaches to knowing; employing both 
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provides a more holistic understanding. We do not want to lose, he argues, what we 
have gained in our embrace of the epistemology of separation (cf., 2). Elder likewise 
proclaims that he “revere[s] the scientific method, with its effort to arrive at 
unbiased and reproducible results, and its quest for a universal language,” but he 
continues by saying that “the highest, and most trustworthy, science arises when the 
scientist is also capable of expressing in a personal voice the love that motivated his 
or her lifetime pursuit of knowledge about volcanoes or snakes or the origin of the 
universe” (Elder 1998, 10–11).     
 On both writers’ view, there is a particular task to be completed by 
each way of knowing that makes both important without raising the worry of 
conflict. Zajonc (2006) makes the point through the use of the distinction between the 
context of discovery and of proof:  “The ‘context of proof’ does indeed require 
careful assessment of insights against the data of experiments and the logic of 
mathematics. But the new insights of science enter as the fruit of contemplative 
gestation, not deductive analysis.” (cf., 4). Philosophers of science usually call this 
the logic of discovery and the logic of justification. The process of discovery might 
include “long contemplative uncertainty” followed by flashes of creative realization. 
Zajonc notes that Heisenberg’s breakthrough on quantum uncertainty took place 
while ill and fevered rather than through logical inferences upon data (cf., 4).   
We agree that we have too long developed an epistemology of separation at 
the expense of fostering connection, empathy, and an attitude of community with—
as opposed to mastery over—the world around us. The primacy of instrumental 
reason has indeed led to the disenchantment of the world which, along with the 
exaltation of the individual and the attendant view of human beings as discrete and 
unattached, makes for little motivation to live and act in ways more congruous with 
other living things. We caution, though, against treating the two “epistemologies” as 
two completely separate methods of investigation. They do capture different 
attitudes, ways of seeing, or perspectives that we can employ as we seek to better 
understand ourselves and the world, and noting this can help us to move beyond the 
tempting but limiting focus on only one way of learning, or one way of seeing 
ourselves in the world. However, as is often the case with concepts and categories, 
we must not reify this dichotomy.   
When one considers examples of discovery in science that seemingly support 
Zajonc’s contention that the epistemology of love plays an important role in science, 
we note that it would be an oversimplification to describe discovery in terms of an 
epistemology of love and justification in terms of logic and abstraction. What we 
find instead are individuals who are engrossed in both, if not literally at the same 
time, then nearly so. Let us consider, for instance, the story told by Carl Hempel of 
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the chemist Kekulé’s struggle to understand the chemical structure of a benzene 
molecule. Kekulé, it is said, fell asleep in front of a fireplace and as he moved in and 
out of slumber saw snakes dancing in the flames. As one grabbed hold of its own tail 
Kekulé suddenly realized that the benzene molecule must be a hexagonal ring 
(Hemple 1996, 47). Hempel uses this story to illustrate the same point that Zajonc 
makes. However neither writer notes the fact that not everyone could have 
concluded the same thing that Kekulé did even had they the same dream. It was the 
mind’s ability to move between—though again we do not mean to suggest a sharp 
dichotomy—the two ways of knowing that enable discoveries. As learners and 
teachers we must move with some fluidity between the two attitudes (and the 
attendant processes) without feeling that we are making cognitive shifts of such a 
magnitude that we cannot do—in our own scale—what Kekulé could do. The 
difficulty will be that there are no obvious rules about how or when, or in what way, 
a person should blend or develop both ways of learning and knowing.   
The relationship between the two attitudes can be seen elsewhere as well. For 
example, Henry David Thoreau observed that the shore of Walden Pond was laid 
with regularly shaped stones due to waves eroding the surrounding land that was 
mixed with such stones. But upon solving this question he adds, interestingly, that, 
“unfortunately, it is no longer a mystery to me” (Thoreau 1985 [1854], 468). 
Similarly, while traveling to Maine’s Mt. Katahdin he remarks upon being amazed 
by discovering phosphorescent wood that, “A scientific explanation … would have 
been altogether out of place here. That is for pale daylight. Science with its retorts 
would have put me to sleep; it was the opportunity to be ignorant that I improved.” 
(Thoreau, 1985 [1864], 731–732). Nonetheless, despite his claim that sometimes 
science gets in the way of us fully aesthetically or emotionally appreciating 
something, he nonetheless spent the greater part of his life trying to better 
understand the natural history, patterns, and processes of the natural world.   
John Muir had fewer doubts about the value of science, arguing explicitly 
that it helps us appreciate and connect with the world around us. Importantly, both 
men were aware of the different ways in which one understands, but neither saw 
them as sharply distinct. Muir, for example, was engaged with the world around 
him in Yosemite Valley (California) as both an amateur scientist—measuring, 
modeling, and testing hypotheses—and a nature mystic. In his attempts to better 
understand how Yosemite Valley was formed, Muir blended the two ways of seeing 
harmoniously. Not only did he carefully measure detritus fields and sketch the 
direction of glacial groves in the rock, but he felt and imagined: “Here I lay down 
and thought of the time when the groove in which I rested was being ground away 
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at the bottom of a vast ice–sheet that flowed over all the Sierra like a slow wind” 
(Badè 1924, 311). 
After describing the examples of the combined epistemologies at play, the 
advantages of place–based and trans–disciplinary learning seem clear. And learning 
about the world around us should involve the development of connectedness and 
creativity, on the one hand, and careful empirical work of the sort emphasized in the 
epistemology of separation, on the other. In moving beyond the traditional focus on 
the objectification of the objects of study, we end up studying local environment as 
our inhabited place in a way that allows embodied engagement and emotional 
connection. As Leopold and Callicott believed, we can foster the idea that we are 
part of nature instead of separate, which becomes easier when we remember that 
nature is home, and home is something we are emotionally connected to in a quite 
particular way. Place–based education should embrace literature, philosophy, poetry 
while at the same time studying and using the scientific method and conclusions of 
ecology, chemistry, biology. There are differences of disciplinary approach, but if we 
help students see connections this potentially aids in teaching them to move fluidly 
between ways of understanding instead of treating different disciplines as sharply 
distinct. That is, a holistic image will not, in fact, emerge for students who merely 
read literature or engage in artwork while studying ecology. There are some ways of 
mitigating this worry, though it is important to realize that the sort of complete 
learning that we are advocating is not the sort that fits neatly into a set of definable 
and prescriptive pedagogical formulas. What we should be doing is providing 
students with enough of an idea of how to think creatively while thinking 
analytically, or how to engage aesthetically while also doing so systematically, so 
they might continue to learn in this way long after leaving the halls of academia. The 
particulars of how this should work will be left to the education experts, but we do 
want to offer one additional argument in favor of the trans–disciplinary approach.       
Zajonc’s use of the epistemologies of separation and love is just one way in 
which we might conceptualize the awareness that traditional science alone provides 
a quite limited perspective. Another way is suggested when we notice how fully we 
rely on models and metaphors that are at once incomplete, incommensurable, and 
yet essential. Models and metaphors are necessary for the simple reason that we do 
not possess anything resembling a monistic account of the world; models and 
metaphors help us as we focus on a particular topic because they give us a 
background against which to understand without requiring that we know all the 
details of that background. For example, discussions of predator/prey relationships 
can take place using the model of undulating but stable populations despite the fact 
that many ecologists reject this model as an accurate description of ecosystems. But 
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yet, it is a useful model or metaphor because it allows discussions of predator/prey 
relationships without requiring the inclusion of complex dis–equilibrium models.     
Bryan Norton and Douglas Noonan advance the idea that learning and 
understanding requires embracing multiple but singly incomplete and sometimes 
incommensurable models and metaphors by pointing out that while ecosystems can 
be thought of as production systems (i.e. systems that produce goods and services 
that we human beings like and need), they can also be conceptualized in numerous 
other ways, such as Leopold’s community of mutually interrelated beings and 
resources. The model or metaphor we choose is relative to our interests. As Norton 
and Noonan observe, “The choice of an appropriate metaphor is not a matter of 
uncertainty that may be remedied by more data—it is instead a choice of a guiding 
metaphor which, in turn, highlights some values and hides others” (Norton and 
Noonan 2007, 670). When we choose to think of ecosystems as production systems 
for human goods, we also are deciding “not to employ alternative metaphors that 
would highlight alternative pathways and alternative values.” Leopold himself, 
Norton and Noonan argue, used multiple metaphors to conceptualize the human 
relationship with the natural world—three temporal scales of the micro–human 
perception, ecological time, and geological time—that involve radically different 
ecological and evolutionary perspectives (Norton and Noonan 2007, 670).   
The point for us here is that as we move between different epistemologies, or 
ways of understanding and learning, we should remember that we are employing 
metaphors and models that are not simply pieces of some larger whole, but are 
different ways of seeing the same thing. Trans–disciplinarity that draws from a 
variety of perspectives has the potential to provide us with richer—even if not neatly 
holistic—understandings of the world. 
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Abstract. Understanding the epistemological dimension of the subject–object dichotomy is 
crucial for environmental learning. Contrasting the epistemologies of separation and love, 
Arthur Zajonc argues that learning is seriously limited unless we focus more attention on 
fostering deep connections of respect, love, and participation with the objects we study. 
Although an attitude of detachment and objectivity is sometimes appropriate, understanding 
such things as social justice and the environment demand an approach that softens the sharp 
dichotomy between knower and thing–to–be–known. While largely agreeing with Zajonc, we 
emphasize that the epistemologies of separation and love should not be seen as wholly 
distinct or unrelated. A deep understanding of ourselves and the world around us depends 
upon a shifting back and forth between these approaches, though this will, admittedly, not 
be susceptible to any strict set of methodological rules. Learning depends upon not only 
understanding how to use these two epistemologies, but, importantly, learning how to shift 
between them with ease. Furthermore, we suggest that Zajonc’s use of the dual concepts of 
the logic of discovery and of justification to illustrate his two epistemologies can be made 
more descriptively accurate and prescriptively useful by noticing that in the process of 
learning—of discovering—investigators can and do move fluidly between seeking detached 
objectivity and connectedness. We embrace a broad pedagogical approach to environmental 
education consistent with Zajonc’s view and that is place–based and multi– and trans–
disciplinary. This includes a rejection of the priority of science over the humanities, a 
narrowing of the gap between knower and thing–to–be–known, and a move away from 
attempts to excessively abstract from particulars to generalities and laws. 
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